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On April 4, 1985, a young woman told an Illinois court that her
story of rape and kidnapping, upon which a still incarcerated man had
been convicted six years earlier, was a complete fabrication.' Due to
her evasive demeanor and certain inconsistencies in her testimony, how-
ever, the judge chose not to believe her and, following well-established
precedents, sent the convicted man back to jail.' In the media firestorm
that resulted, a shocked public expressed its surprise and outrage that
an "innocent" man could continue to serve time for a crime which the
"victim" later claimed had never happened.' Soon thereafter, the Illi-
tB.A. 1983, Point Park College; J.D. Candidate 1987, University of
Pennsylvania.
1 See Woman Recants a Rape Charge Six Years Later, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30,
1985, at A6, col. 1. The woman claimed that she created the rape story because she
thought she might have been pregnant and feared the reaction of her foster parents. She
said that she ripped her clothing, scratched her body with broken glass, inflicted bruises
upon herself, and accused the man eventually convicted because his photograph strongly
resembled the police sketch that she had created. See generally People v. Dotson, 99 111.
App. 3d 117, 119-20, 424 N.E.2d 1319, 1321-22 (1981) (unsuccessful appeal of origi-
nal trial providing summary of the facts as found at the original trial); Starr, Who Is
the Real Victim?, 105 NEWSWEEK, May 20, 1985, at 69, 69-73 (providing a detailed,
albeit commercialized, account of the highly publicized recantation incident). For the
"victim's" recanted account of the story, see C. WEBB, FORGIVE ME (1985) (detailing
"victim's" autobiographical account of the incident).
2 See Same Verdict: Recanting to No Avail, TIME, Apr. 22, 1985, at 24, 24; Re-
canting of a Rape Charge Fails to Free Convict, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1985, at Al,
col. 2; see also Black, Why Judge Samuels Sent Gary Dotson Back to Prison, 71 A.B.A.
J. 56, 56-59 (1985) (article based on interview with judge who rejected the recantation
testimony in which the judge's reasons for doing so are explored); Starr, More Than a
Case of Rape, 105 NEWSWEEK, Apr. 22, 1985, at 21, 21 (brief look at the evidence
presented at the hearing to vacate and reactions to the judge's ruling).
3 See, e.g., Why It's Tough to Take It Back, TIME, Apr. 29, 1985, at 75, 75;
Recantation, Incantation and Rape, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1985, at A26, col. 1 ("Con-
fidence in American justice cannot rest easily when [a person] is sent back to jail on the
word of a woman who is, one way or the other, an acknowledged liar."); Debate Sur-
rounds Rape Decision, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
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nois governor, acting under great public pressure, commuted the con-
vict's sentence to time served.4 The freed felon's subsequent motion for
a new trial based on the recantation testimony was denied. 5 While this
case was unusual enough to become something of a public curiosity, the
situation it presented is not one entirely uncommon to our judicial
system.6
"Recantation" denotes a formal, intentional renunciation by a wit-
ness of her former testimony.7 Recantations have been presented to
courts as a form of evidence warranting a new trial frequently enough
that established rules for their treatment have been developed.8 Al-
though treatment varies somewhat among jurisdictions, recantations are
typically viewed with suspicion9 and are the basis for new trials only in
extraordinary cases10 in which the judge hearing the recantation testi-
mony is reasonably well satisfied that the original trial testimony was
false11 and that a new trial "might" cause a different result12 or would
"probably" result in acquittal. 13 One commentator has said, "No court
4 See N.Y. Times, May 13, 1985, at Al, col. 2. For accounts of the clemency
hearings, see N.Y. Times, May 12, 1985, at A20, col. 1; N.Y. Times, May 11, 1985, at
All, col. 2; N.Y. Times, May 10, 1985, at A16, col. 1.
5 See N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1985, at A19, col. 1 (discussing August 14, 1985
unpublished opinion of Judge Richard J. Fitzgerald of the Cook County Circuit
Court).
" Although members of the bar and the media suggested that this recantation case
was unique-see N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1985, at Al, col. 1, A6, col. 1 ("INlone could
recall a previous case in which the recantation was by the accuser, and the only wit-
ness."); N.Y. Times, May 9, 1985, at A25, col. 1 (case is "profoundly different" be-
cause it draws into question whether there was a crime)-there are in fact many re-
corded cases in which a victim or a sole prosecuting witness has recanted. See, e.g.,
cases collected in Annotation, Recantation by Prosecuting Witness in Sex Crime As
Ground For New Trial, 51 A.L.R. 3D 907 (1973).
1 See 8A R. CIPES, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE-CRIMINAL RULES 1 33.05
(2d ed. 1981).
s See Thacker v. Commonwealth, 453 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Ky. 1970) (explaining
special rules applicable to situations of recanted testimony).
9 See Nilva v. United States, 212 F.2d 115, 124 (8th Cir. 1954) (motion looked
upon with distrust and disfavor); Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 262 (2d Cir.
1925) ("[S]uch testimony is for obvious reasons looked upon with the utmost suspi-
cion."). More generally, applications for a new trial based on any type of newly discov-
ered evidence are not favored. See 58 AM. JUR. 2D New Trial § 164 (1971).
10 See, e.g., Peterson v. State, 426 So. 2d 494, 497 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) (courts
generally pay little regard to recantations and grant new trials based upon them only in
extraordinary and unusual cases); People v. Marquis, 344 Ill. 261, 265, 176 N.E. 314,
315 (1931) (same); Comment, Criminal Law-New Trial-Credibility of New Evi-
dence-Smith v. State, 29 CONN. B.J. 264, 268 (1955) (new trials should be granted
only in extraordinary situations).
11 See 9 FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 22:985 (L. Ed. 1982).
'- See Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87-88 (7th Cir. 1928).
'n See United States v. Krasny, 607 F.2d 840, 844-45 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 445 U.S. 942 (1980) (expressly rejecting the Larrison "possibility" standard); see
generally 12 C. SCOTTI, CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 49.31 (3d ed. 1983)
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wishes a defendant to remain in jail if he has discovered evidence show-
ing that he is not guilty, but after a man has had his day in court, and
has been fairly tried, there is a proper reluctance to give him a second
trial." 4 Relatively few new trials based on the unknowing use of per-
jured testimony have been granted. 5
This Comment dissects the legal treatment of recantations, focus-
ing especially on the recantations of victims and sole prosecution wit-
nesses. Part I of this Comment briefly discusses the evolution of the
current treatment of recantation evidence. Part II focuses on problems
and inadequacies under current law and provides a deeper analysis of
particularly troubling areas of recantation treatment. The first problem
(discussing the split of authority on whether the perjury of a government witness as
newly discovered evidence should warrant a new trial only when such newly discovered
evidence "probably would result in an acquittal," or also when an acquittal "might or
possibly would" result).
11 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CRIMINAL 2D § 557, at
315 (1982).
15 See id. § 557.1, at 347 n.23; Note, Ninth Circuit Adopts Berry Standard for
New Trials Based Upon Perjured Testimony, 11 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 171, 181
(1981). In the following cases, state courts either granted new trials or ruled that it was
error to deny new trials based upon newly discovered recantation evidence. See State v.
Hickle, 133 Ariz. 234, 650 P.2d 1216 (1982); Roath v. State, 185 Ark. 1039, 50
S.W.2d 985 (1932); Meyers v. State, 111 Ark. 299, 163 S.W. 1177 (1914); Bussey v.
State, 69 Ark. 545, 64 S.W. 268 (1901); People v. William, 57 Cal. 2d 263, 368 P.2d
353, 18 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1962); People v. Huskins, 245 Cal. App. 2d 859, 54 Cal. Rptr.
253 (1966); Solis v. State, 262 So. 2d 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 265 So. 2d
372 (Fla. 1972), overruled, 374 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); O'Brien v.
State, 206 So. 2d 217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), overruled, Mollica v. State, 374 So.
2d 1022 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 386 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1980); People v. Busch, 228 Ill.
App. 11 (1923); Key v. State, 235 Ind. 172, 132 N.E. 143 (1956); Dennis v. State, 103
Ind. 142, 2 N.E. 349 (1885); State v. Mounkes, 91 Kan. 653, 138 P. 410 (1914);
Mullins v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1964); Tyree v. Commonwealth, 160
Ky. 706, 170 S.W. 33 (1914); People v. Smallwood, 306 Mich. 49, 10 N.W.2d 303
(1943); Bates v. State, 32 So. 915 (Miss. 1902); State v. Moberly, 121 Mo. 604, 26
S.W. 364 (1894); State v. Greeno, 135 Mont. 580, 342 P.2d 1052 (1959); State v.
Chavez, 87 N.M. 38, 528 P.2d 897 (1974); People v. Friday, 90 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 240, 31
N.Y.S. 399 (1894); Martin v. State, 34 Okla. Crim. 274, 246 P. 647 (1926); Common-
wealth v. Mosteller, 446 Pa. 83, 284 A.2d 786 (1971); Commonwealth v. McCloskey,
270 Pa. Super. 584, 411 A.2d 1239 (1979); Commonwealth v. Krick, 164 Pa. Super.
516, 67 A.2d 746 (1949); Wadkins v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 292, 277 S.W. 684 (1925);
Mann v. State, 44 Tex. 642 (1876); Hodnett v. City of Danville, 152 Va. 955, 146 S.E.
281 (1929); Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843 (1923); Powell v.
Commonwealth, 133 Va. 741, 112 S.E. 657 (1922); State v. Ramel, 65 Wash. 2d 326,
396 P.2d 988 (1964); State v. Elliott, 6 Wash. 2d 393, 107 P.2d 927 (1940); State v.
Powell, 51 Wash. 372, 98 P. 741 (1909); State v. York, 41 Wash. App. 538, 704 P.2d
1252 (1985). In the following cases, federal courts issued holdings similar to those is-
sued by state courts in the cases noted directly above. See United States v. Wallace, 528
F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Meyers, 484 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1973);
Newsome v. United States, 311 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1962); Pettine v. New Mexico, 201
F. 489 (8th Cir. 1912); United States v. Mitchell, 29 F.R.D. 157 (D.N.J. 1962);
United States v. Miller, 61 F. Supp. 919 (D.C.N.Y. 1945). This list should not be
relied upon as exhaustive.
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to be explored is the danger and inaccuracy of indulging a broad pre-
sumption that all recantations are inherently untrustworthy. The next
problem explored is the unrealistically demanding and perhaps overly
discretionary credibility standards currently employed, in part because
of this presumption. Next, the possible due process issues raised by
making the new trial standard too strict will be addressed. Additionally,
the Comment will examine the popular view that such cases are best
handled through use of the executive clemency power. Part III of this
Comment discusses minority views advocating alternative judicial treat-
ment of recantation evidence. Finally, Part IV suggests a proposal that
could be used to relax the standard in certain cases while continuing to
guard carefully against the unwarranted granting of new trials.
I. DOCTRINAL EVOLUTION
An analysis of the evolution of the treatment of recantation reveals
that encouraging strides have been made toward ensuring the availabil-
ity of a vehicle through which justice may be achieved. Regrettably,
however, the history of recantation treatment reveals the inadequacies
that have plagued, and remain in, our system. While a clear picture of
the past is somewhat difficult to discern because of the lack of uniform-
ity among the states, a generalized account of the evolution of treatment
of recantation is possible.
Before the 1900's there was frequently no judicial remedy for
cases in which perjury by a material witness was discovered postconvic-
tion.16 It has been estimated that more than half of all criminal cases
tried near the beginning of this century contained some such tainted
evidence: perjury was commonplace.11 In some of the more shocking
cases defendants were convicted of having murdered individuals later
found to be alive18 and of having committed robberies that never oc-
26 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, RE-
PORT ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, No. 8, at 42-45 (1931); Berman, Newly Discovered
Evidence-A Defendant's Chance for A New Trial, 28 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 31, 31
(1983). See generally Comment, Criminal Law and Procedure-Remedies Available
to Convicted Defendant When New Facts Are Found, 39 MICH. L. REv. 963, 963-64
(1941) [hereinafter Remedies] ("For centuries it seems to have been assumed that there
was no method by which the verdict of a jury, having once become final, might be set
aside.")
17 See Whitman, A Proposed Solution to the Problem of Perjury in Our Courts,
59 DICK. L. REv. 127, 145 (1955) (concluding that it is "more difficult to convict a
perjurer than a murderer," and that state laws ought to require the "proof beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard rather than follow the rule that two witnesses and suffi-
cient corroboration are necessary to prove perjury).
'1 See E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 39-44, 50-57 (1932).
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curred.19 Utterly erroneous convictions were affirmed by appellate
courts because they were incompetent on quasi-jurisdictional grounds to
consider evidence of perjury discovered postconviction as grounds for a
new trial.20 The courts lacked an inherent power to grant such relief.2"
An appeal for executive clemency was often viewed as the only
recourse.
22
Frustrated defendants often sought remedy through the common
law writs, but these were generally of little assistance. The highly tech-
nical writ of coram nobis, which lies to correct errors of fact not appar-
ent in the record that would have prevented judgment had they been
known,2" proved to be ineffective because most courts rejected its appli-
cation in the recantation context.24 The writ of habeas corpus also
proved to be an impotent remedy in this area, as the courts held that it
would not be issued unless state officials "knowingly" used the perjured
testimony.25
'9 See id. at 331-34.
20 See id. at 375-76. Typically the incompetency of a court to consider perjury
discovered postconviction as ground for a new trial-resulted from the fact that a new
trial could not be granted upon matters not appearing in the record. See infra note 22.
21 See Berman, supra note 16, at 31.
21 See People v. Mooney, 176 Cal. 105, 109, 167 P. 696, 697 (1917) (executive,
not court, may grant relief via pardoning power when newly discovered evidence sur-
faces), rehearing en banc, 178 Cal. 525, 530, 174 P. 325, 327 (1918) (perjured testi-
mony or concealment or suppression of material evidence improper basis to set aside
judgment), cert. denied, 248 U.S. 579 (1918); State v. Sadowski, 256 S.W. 753, 756
(Mo. 1923) (court can only consider errors on face of record; defendant should appeal
to pardoning board with newly discovered evidence of the confession of another person
to the crime).
21 See Remedies, supra note 16, at 967.
24 See Mooney, 178 Cal. at 529-30, 174 P. at 326-27 (writ of coram nobis does
not lie to readjudicate issue of fact such as truth or falsity of testimony); O'Callaghan v.
State, 461 So. 2d 1354, 1356 (Fla. 1984) (motion for leave to file a petition for writ of
error coram nobis on ground that material witness recanted testimony denied because
change of testimony would not have conclusively prevented entry of judgment under
circumstances); see also Donnelly, Unconvicting The Innocent, 6 VAND. L. Rxv. 20,
24-28 (1952) (stating that most courts have refused to extend the writ of coram nobis to
cases putting in issue any fact adjudicated at the trial or to convictions based on per-
jured testimony unless knowingly used by the prosecution); Remedies, supra note 16, at
968-70 (American courts have engrafted so many conditions upon the availability of the
writ of coram nobis that its usefulness is all but destroyed.); Comment, Relief From
Convictions Based Upon Perjured Testimony-A Proposal For A Reasonable Stan-
dard, 11 SANTA CLARA LAW. 316, 320-22 (1971) [hereinafter Relie] (standard for
writ of coram nobis in California is so high that it is useless). The writ is, however,
considered a proper vehicle by a few courts, which continue to use it. See, e.g., Teat v.
State, 453 So. 2d 760, 761 (Ala. 1984) (affirming denial of petition for writ of coram
nobis on the merits).
2' See Relief supra note 24, at 322-23. See generally Murray, Convictions Ob-
tained By Perjured Testimony: A Comparative View, 27 OHIo ST. L.J. 102, 102-08
(1966) (arguing that the distinction between knowing and unknowing use is artificial
and should be abandoned).
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Defendants thus found themselves battling over the technicalities
of which remedy, if any, was available, rather than over whether an
injustice had occurred.28 Further, even if a vehicle for relief could be
found, in some jurisdictions conviction of the recanting witness for per-
jury had to be obtained before the recantation testimony would be con-
sidered by the courts.2 7 State legislatures responded with statutes em-
powering courts to grant new trials on the basis of newly discovered
evidence.28 Commentators proposed a uniform rule that would have al-
lowed a new trial to be granted on the ground that "new and material
evidence, which if introduced at the trial would probably have changed
the verdict or finding of the court, [has subsequently been] discovered
which the defendant could not with reasonable diligence have discov-
ered and produced upon the trial."2 9 Initially even this rule for chal-
lenging a conviction based upon subsequently recanted testimony met
with resistance. Some courts held that where the credibility of a witness
had been examined at trial, that witness's recantation was merely im-
peaching and thus not a ground for a new trial."0 Other courts noted
that the rule applied to civil but not to criminal cases.31 Eventually,
however, the commentators' view became widely accepted as an appro-
priate ground for challenging a conviction based on recanted testimony;
new trials can now be sought in nearly all jurisdictions on the ground
of newly discovered evidence. 2
2 See Murray, supra note 25, at 103-04; see also Relief supra note 24, at 322-
23 (discussing the intricacies of a writ of coram nobis and a writ of habeas corpus and
why neither provides relief for the innocently convicted in California).
27 See State v. Fuentes, 66 N.M. 52, 59, 342 P.2d 1080, 1084 (1959); Note, Crim-
inal Law-Judicial Discretion in Considering Recantation as a Ground for a New
Trial, 39 MINN. L. REV. 316, 318 (1955).
28 See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(g) (McKinney 1983); see also
Berman, supra note 16, at 31-32 (discussing the development of this New York statute
into its modern day version). See generally CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 1052-53
(Official Draft 1930) (listing existing state statutes authorizing the granting of new
trials on the basis of newly discovered evidence).
29 CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 28, at 139-40.
3o See Donnelly, supra note 24, at 23 n.14 (recantations are merely impeaching).
This view was dispelled rather quickly. See 3 C. WRIGHT, supra note 14, § 557.1, at
347 ("Although [a recantation] is not newly discovered evidence at all in the real sense,
but only an assertion that the old testimony is false, it is not merely impeaching, but is
substantial and material testimony .... ").
Si See, e.g., State v. Casey, 201 N.C. 620, 629, 161 S.E. 81, 86 (1931) (Brogden,
J., concurring).
52 See 58 AM. JuR. 2D New Trial § 164 (1971). Some courts have expressly rec-
ognized an inherent power in themselves to grant such relief absent specific statutory
authority. See, e.g., State v. Mooney, 670 S.W.2d 510, 515-16 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (in
the absence of applicable rules or statutes, the court has inherent power to remand as
justice requires); State v. Fuentes, 66 N.M. 52, 60, 342 P.2d 1080, 1085 (1959) (inher-
ent power to prevent miscarriage of justice enables court to permit filing of new trial
motion).
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Most courts have derived the requirements for a general new trial
motion from a standard proposed in a nineteenth century Georgia case,
Berry v. State.33 The Berry test provides that a new trial may be
granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence if: (1) the evidence
is discovered subsequent to the trial; (2) the evidence could not have
been discovered before trial by the exercise of due diligence; (3) the
evidence is material; (4) the evidence will probably change the result if
a new trial is granted; and (5) the evidence is not merely cumulative or
impeaching.3'
More recently, some courts have applied a purportedly less strin-
gent new trial standard in cases where the new trial motion was based
specifically upon recantation of perjured testimony. Derived from the
Seventh Circuit case Larrison v. United States, 5 the test provides that
a new trial is to be granted when: (1) the court is reasonably well
satisfied that the testimony given by a material witness is false; (2) the
jury might have reached a different conclusion without such testimony;
and (3) the party seeking the new trial was taken by surprise when the
false testimony was given and was unable to meet it or did not know of
its falsity until after trial."6 While it was supposed to create a more
relaxed standard for recantation cases, Larrison has recently been criti-
cized as actually imposing a more stringent test than Berry.37 Regard-
less of which standard is used, however, nearly all new trial motions
based on unknowing use38 of perjured testimony are routinely denied
by the courts because both standards impose an excessive burden on the
defendant." Of the vast number of cases filed in the California state
courts, for example, only two new trials have ever been granted on
recantation grounds,40 and in the entire federal court system few mo-
tions for a new trial based on unknowing use of perjured testimony
38 10 Ga. 511 (1851).
34 See id. at 527. Berry also imposes the requirement that the "affidavit of the
witness himself should be produced, or its absence accounted for." Id.
35 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928).
s6 See id. at 87-88.
87 See Note, supra note 15, at 180-81.
8 A general reference in this Comment to perjured testimony should be taken to
mean perjured testimony used unknowingly by the prosecution. Where knowing use is
evident, due process is denied to the defendant and the stringent standards discussed
herein are for the most part inapplicable. See generally 12 C. ScoTTI, CYCLOPEDIA Or
FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 4935 (3d ed. Supp. 1983) (knowing use of perjury is
prosecutorial misconduct which may serve as the ground for a new trial).
80 See infra notes 42-88 and accompanying text.
40 See People v. Williams, 57 Cal. 2d 263, 368 P.2d 353, 18 Cal. Rptr. 729
(1962); People v. Hushins, 245 Cal. App. 2d 859, 54 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1966). See
generally Relief, supra note 24, at 319 (discussing the unusual fact patterns of the two
cases above).
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ha,-f ever been successful.41
II. PROBLEMS AND INADEQUACIES UNDER CURRENT LAW
A. The Credibility Standard and Presumptive Untrustworthiness
Although the courts have haggled much over the precise test to
apply to a new trial motion based upon allegedly perjured testimony,
most courts never get past the basic credibility inquiry.42 The judge
hearing the new trial motion, typically the same judge who presided at
the original trial, usually decides that she believes the original trial tes-
timony rather than the recantation. 43 The precise credibility standard
used varies among jurisdictions. It has been held that the judge must be
reasonably well satisfied that the trial testimony was false,44 convinced
that the recantation is probably true,45 or reasonably certain that the
recantation is genuine. 48 Drawing distinctions between these standards
may be likened to splitting hairs. In varying degrees, each is too diffi-
cult for defendants to meet.
The main reason that the credibility standard trial courts apply to
recantations can be too stringent for an innocent person to satisfy is
that the courts effectively indulge a presumption that recantations are
untrustworthy.47 This presumption is so strong that some courts have
41 See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 467 F. Supp. 1111 (W.D. Pa.), vacated and
indictment dismissed upon request of U.S. Attorney's Office, 606 F.2d 391 (3d Cir.
1979); United States v. Wallace, 484 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1973). See generally Note,
supra note 15, at 181-83 (stating that a motion for a new trial is rarely granted regard-
less of the particular standard court uses).
42 See Note, supra note 15, at 181-83 (motions for new trial are seldom granted
regardless of the standard used). The "haggling" centers on which of the two standards
should be applied-the text articulated in Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511 (1851), or the test
developed in Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928). See supra at notes
33-37 and accompanying text. The main differences between the approaches are the
degree of certainty required regarding the likelihood of a different result at a new trial
and whether knowledge of the prior false testimony is imputed to the jury. See Note,
supra note 15, at 176. It has also been said that the Larrison standard differs in that it
requires proof of the false testimony before application of the other elements. See id. at
181. But see Note, Criminal Procedure: Minnesota Adopts the Larrison Standard for
Granting a New Trial Because of Newly Discovered Evidence: State v. Caldwell, 67
MINN. L. REV. 1314, 1324 n.79 (1983) (suggesting that both standards impose a pre-
liminary credibility determination before considering the evidence).
43 See 3 C. WRIGHT, supra note 14, § 557.1, at 349; Note, supra note 15, at 181.
See also L. ORIFELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES § 33:49,
at 332 n.6 (1967) (listing cases).
44 See United States v. Larrison, 24 F.2d 82, 87 (7th Cir. 1928).
41 See State v. Shelton, 21 N.C. App. 662, 665, 205 S.E.2d 316, 318-19, cert.
denied, 285 N.C. 667, 207 S.E.2d 760 (1974).
48 See State v. Hegland, 355 N.W.2d 803, 806 (N.D. 1984).
17 Cf. 8A R. CIPES, supra note 7, 33.05, at 33-44 ("Apparently the courts in
effect indulge a presumption that the recantation is false. The Second Circuit has
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required a recanting witness to be convicted of perjury before the re-
cantation testimony will even be considered, unless conviction is impos-
sible due to the witness's death. 8 The literature surrounding the legal
meaning of "presumption" has stressed the lack of consistency in the
courts' usage of the term.49 A definition recently offered by one author
in an attempt to provide some clarity is that "a presumption is a stan-
dardized practice, under which certain facts are held to call for uniform
treatment with respect to -their effect as proof of other facts." 50 Accord-
ing to this definition a presumption allows a court to infer the existence
of certain unknown facts once specified other facts are shown to exist.51
In this sense presumptions differ little from inferences, 52 which "satu-
rate the judicial fact-finding process." '5' A presumption, however, is
mandatory upon a court;" once the court acknowledges certain facts, it
must recognize the existence of others, while an inference represents
merely a permissible deduction that a court may draw from a set of
facts.
55
The distinction between a presumption and an inference is often
somewhat blurred. The proposition that recantations are suspect and
inherently unreliable may be treated as a presumption as follows: since
the witness has already testified as to her version of the facts, the initial
testimony is true and any recantation of that testimony is not trustwor-
thy. While the courts have not formally adopted this presumption as
mandatory, the research done for this Comment uncovered no recanta-
tion case in which the substantially identical proposition that recanta-
stated, for example, that a motion based thereon should be viewed with 'the utmost
suspicion.' There is some support in common experience for the rationality of this pre-
sumption") (footnote omitted).
48 See 58 AM. JuR. 2D New Trial § 175 (1971).
49 See, e.g., E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 344, at 965 (3d ed. 1984)
(venturing the assertion that "'presumption' is the slipperiest member of the family of
legal terms, except for its first cousin, 'burden of proof' "); Laughlin, In Support of the
Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MICH. L. REv. 195, 206-07 (1953) (listing eight
senses in which the term has been used by the courts).
50 E. CLEARY, supra note 49, § 342, at 965.
, See Home Ins. Co. v. Weide, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 438, 441-42 (1870).
5, Id. (describing an inference as "the application of logic or rationalization...
to support certain deductions made from relevant experience").
53 I S. GARD, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 3.2, at 128 (6th ed. 1972).
Id. A presumption, however, may be rebutted where the party against whom it
operates introduces proof in contradiction. See E. CLEARY, supra note 49, § 342, at
966.
55 See E. CLEARY, supra note 49, § 342, at 965-66 (suggesting that inferences
drawn by a trial judge from the evidence presented should not be confused with pre-
sumptions); see also Manchester v. Dugan, 247 A.2d 827, 829 (Me. 1965) ("A pre-
sumption is a conclusion which a rule of law directs shall be made from proof of cer-
tain facts, but an inference is a deduction which reason and logic dictates shall be made
from a fact situation.").
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tions are inherently unreliable has not reared its head. As one commen-
tator has stated:
It should be noted that there are some borderline cases
where the applicable rule of law falls short of requiring ab-
solutely the assumption of facts, but does have the effect of
permitting inferences to be drawn or assumptions to be
made where logic might fail. Some authorities would include
such situations within the definition of presumptions.56
The courts' treatment of recantation testimony represents such a bor-
derline case. Although courts are not required to presume the untrust-
worthiness of recantation testimony, the long-standing rule that such
testimony is suspect and inherently unreliable ultimately produces the
same effect. Thus one could view the courts' deep historical suspicion of
recantation testimony as a presumption.
A presumption may be justified on the basis of the probative value
of the basic facts that support it57 or necessitated by lack of access to
evidence." Additional justifications often advanced are expediency and
public policy."9 It is thus necessary to look at the contemporary purpose
of a presumption, because if the original reason for the presumption
has been undermined, the presumption may be no longer justifiable.
60
While the courts are far from clear on the matter, two justifica-
tions frequently emerge for the presumption that recantations are in-
herently unreliable. The first is a long-standing judicial fear that the
defendant is trying to manipulate the court by presenting a recantation
induced by duress, bribery, or misplaced sympathy.61 In People v.
" 1 S. GARD, supra note 53, § 3.3, at 131 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
57 See D. LOUISELL, J. KAPLAN, & J. WALTZ, PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE AND
PROOF 871-72 (1968).
See 1 S. GARD, supra note 53, § 3.1, at 126.
See id.
60 See, e.g., United States v. Provident Trust .Co., 291 U.S. 272, 285 (1934) (re-
fusing to apply a conclusive presumption that a woman is capable of childbearing for as
long as she lives).
81 See, e.g., State v. Parker, 249 S.C. 139, 142, 153 S.E.2d 183, 184 (1967) ("To
hold such affidavits sufficient to require the granting of a new trial would be to open
the door to fraud and perjury, as well as to invite interminable delays in the disposition
of causes."); 58 AM. JUR. 2D New Trial § 164 (1971) (footnote omitted) ("In order to
prevent, as far as possible, the fraud and imposition which defeated parties may be
tempted to practice as a last resort to escape the consequence of an adverse verdict, an
applicant setting up the discovery of new evidence should always be subjected to the
closest scrutiny by the court."); see also Note, Criminal Law-New Trial- Recanta-
tion by State's Witness as Ground For New Trial, 22 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
599, 601 (1953) (Powerful defendants would exert pressure on witnesses if courts were
easily swayed by recantations.); Why It's Tough To Take It Back, supra note 3, at 75
(stating that courts have regarded recanted testimony with suspicion because of the
invalid many reasons for recanting trial testimony, including intimidation, bribery and
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Shilitano," perhaps the most frequently cited recantation case, thecourt stated without citation:
Bearing in mind that the witnesses to crimes of violence are
often of a low and degraded character and that after they
have given their testimony they are sometimes influenced by
bribery and other improper considerations, it is evident that
the establishment of a rule which left the power to depend
upon recantation by such witnesses would be subversive of
the proper administration of justice . . . . There is no form
of proof so unreliable as recanting testimony. In the popular
mind it is often regarded as of great importance. Those ex-
perienced in the administration of the criminal law know
well its untrustworthy character."3
While the court's reasoning arguably may have been "with insight
correct for its day," '64 the conclusion that most witnesses today are
likely to be unscrupulous is suspect. Any witness may be influenced by
bribery or improper motives. But if the justification for the presump-
tion against recantations is the likelihood of bribery or improper mo-
tive, then a jurisdiction deciding whether its cases will be governed by
the presumption should determine whether a verifiable pattern of such
likelihood exists. Rather than rely on such evidence, however, the
courts seem to rely solely on the bald assertion that recantations are per
se unreliable.
Other reasons given by courts that indulge the presumption are
the need for finality of judgments and the concern for husbanding judi-
cial resources.65 It is said that the stability and security of all verdicts
would be threatened if verdicts could be set aside purely on a recanting
witness's affidavit.6" As one court has aptly noted, however, the need
for finality in criminal trials, though surely a strong one, has been bal-
anced against the need to minimize injustice, and the scales have al-
ready been tipped in favor of allowing relitigation by allowing motions
for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.6 7 In sum, "[t]o say
misplaced sympathy). This long-standing judicial fear is apparently based on the belief
that perjurious witnesses rarely recant out of remorse for participating in the conviction
of an innocent person, and that recantations thus have no purpose but to manipulate
the court. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 14, § 557.1, at 351.
62 218 N.Y. 161, 112 N.E. 733 (1916).
63 Id. at 169-70, 112 N.E. at 735-36.
e' Berman, supra note 16, at 39.
65 See Comment, Criminal Law-New Trial-Credibility of New Evi-
dence-Smith v. State, 29 CONN. B.J. 264, 268 (1955).
68 See State v. Hegland, 355 N.W.2d 803, 806 (N.D. 1984).
67 See Cole v. State, 589 S.W.2d 941, 942-43 (Tenn. Grim. App. 1979).
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that it is more important to decide criminal cases and leave them undis-
turbed than to decide them justly is . . . a reprehensible way to vindi-
cate the judicial process."6
Nor can the presumption against recantations be justified on the
theory that lack of access to evidence necessitates it. Perhaps the pre-
sumption could be justified on this theory if case law showed the courts
grasping desperately for clues as to what might have induced the recan-
tations while surrounded by factual silence. On the contrary, however,
actual evidence of duress"9 or bribery"0 has been discussed in the major-
ity of the cases in which new trials were denied, and thus it does not
seem that courts lack access to facts pertaining to the validity of recan-
tations. Accordingly, the presumption against recantations serves as lit-
tle more than an obstacle to an innocent person attempting to rely on a
legitimate recantation.
The origin of the presumption that recantations are inherently un-
reliable is not well documented. Early cases indicate that the current
presumption of untrustworthiness may have derived from the belief that
the verdict of the jury warrants a presumption that the witness's trial
testimony was true and that recanted testimony is therefore false.7 1 It
has been shown, however, that juries have ho special skills at detecting
deception by witnesses.7 2 In fact, in recent experiments testing mock
jurors' ability to recognize deceitful statements, the subjects' percentage
of success was no higher than it would have been through random
guessing. Thus the deference one might give the jury's finding in a
Donnelly, supra note 24, at 37.
" See, e.g., United States v. Atkins, 545 F.2d 1153, 1154 (8th Cir. 1976) (evi-
dence of death threats); Teat v. State, 453 So. 2d 760, 761 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984)
(evidence of harassment); People v. Worthen, 105 I1. App. 3d 386, 388-89, 434 N.E.2d
423, 425 (1982) (pressures from relatives of both the defendant and the victim); State v.
Carter, 66 N.C. App. 21, 31-32, 311 S.E.2d 5, 11 (1984) (pressure from fellow inmates
who accused recanting codefendant of being a "snitch").
70 See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 145 Ariz. 193, 194, 700 P.2d 891, 892 (1985) (evi-
dence that defendant offered witness financial support to induce recantation); Lipsey v.
State, 170 Ga. App. 212, 214, 316 S.E.2d 774, 776 (1984) (Pope, J. and Deen, J.,
dissenting) (mother told incest victim staying in home for children that she could come
home if she recanted); Cole v. State, 589 S.W.2d 941, 942 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979)
(pretrial evidence that defendant had asked the victim to drop the charges in exchange
for money and a promise that defendant would not attack the victim again).
71 See People v. Tallmadge, 114 Cal. 427, 431, 46 P. 282, 283 (1896); People v.
Marquis, 344 Ill. 261, 265, 176 N.E. 314, 315 (1931).
71 See Shaffer, The Defendant's Testimony, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE
AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 138-40 (S. Kassin & L. Wrightsmon eds. 1985) (discussing an
observer's inaccuracy in detecting deception); see also Miller & Burgoon, Factors Af-
fecting Assessments of Witness Credibility, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM
169-94 (N. Kerr & R. Pray eds. 1982) (providing a thorough discussion of how per-
ceptions of credibility are made and analyzing the results of various studies).
73 See Shaffer, supra note 72, at 139.
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different context may not be fully appropriate when a subsequent new
trial motion raises the very question of witnesses' deceit. Even if it is
entirely fair for the defendant to have the burden of persuading the
court as to the veracity of the recantation because the jury's verdict is
presumed to be correct, it is unfair to say that the presumption that the
jury's verdict is correct warrants the further presumption that recanta-
tion evidence is inherently unreliable. The defendant may have "the
laboring oar to rebut the presumption that the verdict is correct" '74 but
cannot reasonably be expected to advance at all against the strong tide
of presumptive untrustworthiness,
Furthermore, while the courts indulge the strong presumption that
all recantations are somehow tainted, they do not articulate clearly how
a defendant may rebut this presumption.7 5 Such a presumption may
not be rebuttable at all in the many factual situations in which the
conviction is based mainly on the recanting witness's original trial testi-
mony without substantial corroborating evidence. For example, a court
may refuse to believe the recantation of a rape "victim," yet what more
"could a defendant do . . . than to have the victim swear she made up
the crime" ?7  Elimination of the presumption against recantations
would not radically alter recantation law. While giving credence to re-
cantation testimony may conjure up for many visions of criminals em-
barking upon intimidation sprees to "encourage" recantations, there is
no indication that such a fear is rationally based. This scenario is quite
unlike the situations in which recantations usually occur-namely, tri-
als involving sex crimes77 or those in which a codefendant who was a
chief witness for the prosecution recants. 8
It should be emphasized that the ultimate relief that the convict
seeks typically is not immediate release but simply a new trial."9 Be-
cause of the need for finality of judgments and the scarcity of judicial
resources, the courts are well justified in granting new trial motions
cautiously. The courts should not be so penurious, however, in cases in
which the potential for injustice is so great. "The specter of judicial
overwork often fails to materialize, and even if it does it should not be
' State v. Casey, 201 N.C. 620, 624, 161 S.E. 81, 83 (1931).
71 While conclusive presumptions are permitted in civil cases, presumptions must
be rebuttable in criminal cases. See generally J. WALTZ, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 275-81
(2d ed. 1983) (discussing the operation of presumptions in criminal cases).
7" Starr, supra note 1, at 73.
77 See, e.g., cases collected in Annotation, supra note 6, at 970; see also N.Y.
Times, May 9, 1985, at A25, col. 1 (briefly discussing recantations in sex crime cases).
78 See Berman, supra note 16, at 39 ("Frequently, the recanting witness will be a
codefendant, who for reasons of his own, decides to change his story.").
71 See id. at 46-48 (explaining that "a new trial is the customary order").
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determinative of an innocent man's freedom."'80 If a convicted person is
innocent, a new trial will enable the court to correct a heinous error.
"Truth will ultimately prevail, and any individual guilty of a crime
will finally answer for the same.""
Finally, judges considering motions for new trials should be hesi-
tant to apply such a high credibility standard because credibility, as a
finding of fact, is only reviewable on appeal if wholly unsupported by
the evidence.8 2 Great weight is given to the conclusions of the judge
hearing the recantation evidence.8 3 Indeed, judicial discretion in evalu-
ating credibility is currently so great that even when a recanting wit-
ness is later tried and adjudged guilty of perjury for original trial testi-
mony, the courts in most jurisdictions are, still not required to grant a
new trial.8 4 Lack of meaningful judicial review is especially significant
in the recantation area because typically the judge who considers the
new trial motion is the same judge who presided at the original trial.
Having sentenced and perhaps convicted the defendant, the trial judge
may well experience a "natural resistance to reversing ' 85 and behave
defensively with respect to her own and the original jury's credibility
perceptions.88
Finally, reversal of denials of motions for new trials is difficult
because trial judges rarely state the factual bases for their determina-
tions on such motions.87 Despite the overwhelming importance of mak-
ing accurate findings, the factual analyses of recantations by judges
considering motions for new trials have been criticized as "usually mere
80 Donnelly, supra note 24, at 38.
81 People v. Shilitano, 218 N.Y. 161, 195, 112 N.E. 733, 744 (1916) (Hogan, J.
and Hiscock, J., dissenting).
82 See 3 C. WRIGHT, supra note 14, § 557.1, at 344; see also DiCarlo v. United
States, 6 F.2d 364, 369 (2d Cir. 1925) (holding that denial of a motion for a new trial
was not reviewable at all and that an appeal for clemency was the only recourse).
83 See Shockley, A Chance for A Second Chance: New Evidence and New Trials,
19 TENN. B.J. 23, 25 (1983).
84 See Berman, supra note 16, at 39. But see Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 270
Pa. Super. 584, 591-92, 411 A.2d 1239, 1243 (1979) (Cercone, P.J., concurring)
(where the very judge who had presided at the recanting witness's perjury trial found
an adequate basis for the witness's plea of guilty and later denied the applicant's
postverdict motion based upon the same recantation, even the strictest jurisdictions
would find an abuse of discretion in denying a motion for a new trial).
85 8A R. CIPES, supra note 7, 1 33.03[1], at 33-20 nn. 10-11; see also Donnelly,
supra note 24, at 37 ("Understandably there is a strong reluctance to admit that the
state, which maintains right and justice, can commit mistakes . . ").
88 See N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1985, at A26, col. 1; see also N.Y. Times, Apr. 13,
1985, at Al, col. 1, A6, col. 5 (Sam Adams, a prominent Chicago criminal defense
attorney, explains that the Illinois criminal code was changed in 1983 to allow such
cases to be brought before different judges because for years attorneys had "complained
that it was futile to ask the trial judge to overturn the conviction because of error.").
8" See Note, supra note 15, at 181.
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conclusionary statements."88
B. Due Process Concerns
Current treatment of recantations raises serious due process con-
cerns."9 In Mooney v. Holohan,9' the Supreme Court said that a con-
viction based solely on perjured testimony knowingly used by prosecut-
ing authorities violates a defendant's due process rights to a fair trial.91
The same is true when the government knowingly allows unsolicited
false evidence to go uncorrected.92 Some commentators further believe
that it is fundamentally unfair under any circumstances to let stand a
conviction based solely on perjured testimony:93
The fact that the perjured testimony was unwittingly used
by the prosecution does not change the fact that there was
state action in indicting, trying and convicting the accused.
Nor should the fact that the imprisoned person is serving a
sentence for a crime which he may not have committed be
ignored. A court appears to do violence to the notion that
due process is based upon a concept of fairness when it ad-
mits that a miscarriage of justice may have resulted but then
says that due process has not been violated.94
While many courts have stubbornly clung to an unjustifiably strict
and technical concept of "state action," a necessary element in any due
process claim, the better reasoned opinions have taken the view that a
conviction based upon perjured testimony, even if unknowingly used,
results in a constitutional error.95 If fundamental concepts of justice
88 Id. at 182.
89 See generally Murray, supra note 25, at 102-07 (discussing the due process
questions raised by use of perjured testimony under United States law and the laws of
various other countries).
90 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
91 Id. at 112-13; see also Williams v. United States, 500 F.2d 105, 107-08 (9th
Cir. 1974) (ruling that the perjury of a government agent warranted a new trial).
92 See Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 30-32 (1957); 3 C. WRIGHT, supra note 14,
§ 557.1, at 341.
93 See Murray, supra note 25, at 107, 115-16.
94 Id. at 106.
91 See Jones v. Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335, 338 (6th Cir. 1938); People v. Cihlar, 125
Ill. App. 3d 204, 211-12, 465 N.E.2d 625, 630 (1984); People v. Shannon, 28 Ill. App.
3d 873, 877, 329 N.E.2d 399, 404 (1975); Riley v. State, 93 Nev. 461, 462, 567 P.2d
475, 476 (1977); People v. Yamin, 45 Misc. 2d 407, 416-17, 257 N.Y.S.2d 11, 22-23
(Sup. Ct. 1965); see also Note, supra note 15, at 182 (effect on accused is the same
regardless of the government's knowledge). But see Burke v. Egeler, 512 F.2d 221, 227-
29 (6th Cir. 1975) (questioning the validity of a broad reading of Jones, but expressly
declining to overrule it).
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condemn convictions obtained through perjured testimony knowingly
used, they must "with equal abhorrence condemn as a travesty a con-
viction [based] upon [even unknovingly used] perjured testi-
mony . . . ,, 9 It follows that if one cannot effectively challenge a con-
viction based upon perjured testimony, due process is similarly
offended. Specifically, making the new trial standard virtually impossi-
ble to satisfy would seem to be as fundamentally unfair as allowing
innocent persons to remain incarcerated as a result of knowingly per-
jured testimony. If it is patently unjust to refuse a new trial when con-
viction rests solely on testimony known to be perjured, denying the de-
fendant an effective chance to prove perjury is also patently unjust.9
Thus, even if "mere recantation" is not in itself a ground for invoking
the due process clause against a conviction,"8 the absence of a realisti-
cally attainable remedy for those convicted through perjured testimony
is a violation of due process.9
Due to the unreasonably high credibility standard courts use, there
are few cases in which recantations were credited and new trials were
granted.l00 The current standard is so rigorous that recantation testi-
mony "basically falls on deaf ears."' 1 This scarcity of successful new
trial motions based on recantation testimoriy suggests that the current
standard does not permit a realistically attainable remedy and hence
may violate due process. At the very least, a conviction based upon per-
jured testimony is inherently unfair and compromises judicial
integrity.
10 2
As the Supreme Court has indicated, where the jury's verdict is
tainted by perjured testimony, the courts should be less hesitant to
grant a new trial and more eager "to see that the waters of justice are
not polluted . . . .The government of "a strong and free nation does
91 Jones, 97 F.2d at 338.
9 See State v. Mooney, 670 S.W.2d 510, 515 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
" See Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411, 413 (1942); Donnelly, supra note 24, at
25 n.27.
See Jones v. Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335, 338 (6th Cir. 1938) (requiring states to
afford a corrective judicial process to remedy conviction based on perjured testimony).
0 See sources cited supra note 15.
101 TIME, Apr. 22, 1985, at 24, 24 (quoting Thomas Royce, a prominent Chicago
criminal defense attorney). See generally 3 C. WRIGHT, supra note 14, § 557.1, at
341-52 (stringent judicial standards warranted because motives for recantation are
bribery and coercion, not remorse); Note, supra note 15, at 181-82 (new trials are
seldom granted regardless of the standard used).
102 See Note, supra note 42, at 1325 ("[Aillowing a conviction to stand in spite of
recognized perjury compromises the integrity of the criminal justice system."); see also
8A R. CiPEs, supra note 7, 1 33.05, at 33 (suggesting that the troubling question is
whether a conviction based upon testimony of an admitted perjurer should ever stand);
Relief supra note 24, at 326 ("[S]uch convictions undermine the system of criminal
justice.").
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not need convictions based upon such testimony. It cannot afford to
abide with them."' 3 Having lost the presumption of innocence at a
trial at which perjury may have precluded a finding of reasonable
doubt, the defendant may find the burden of proving the trial testimony
false so difficult as to be effectively insuperable."" Such a result is pa-
tently unfair and raises serious due process concerns.
C. The Executive Clemency Power
It has been said that "to pardon a man for being innocent is an
irony."' 0 5 Nevertheless, many persons have voiced the view that the
executive clemency power should be used in recantation cases in which
the court's credibility standard precludes a fair result."0 6 Whether the
American people should ever be satisfied with principles of law that
tend to allow incarceration of innocent persons is itself questionable as
a general matter.107 More specifically, sporadic use of the executive
clemency power is not an adequate mechanism for dealing with the
problems caused by trial judges who refuse to believe recantations be-
103 Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 14 (1956).
104 See N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1985, at Al, col. 1, A6, col. 3 (comments by Profes-
sor Ronald Allen of the Northwestern University School of Law) (overturning a convic-
tion on the basis of recanted testimony is "very difficult, verging on the impossible.");
supra text at notes 76-77; cf. Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 270 Pa. Super. 584, 591-
92, 411 A.2d 1239, 1241 (1979) (judge had refused to credit recantation for new trial
purposes even though he had presided over the recanting witness's perjury trial and
had found a factual basis for and accepted a plea of guilty to a charge of perjury).
105 Weihofen, The Affect of A Pardon, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 177, 192 (1939).
106 See N.Y. Times, May 14, 1985, at A26, col. I (editorial praising clemency as
the ultimate solution to recantation problems); Why it's Tough to Take It Back, TIME,
Apr. 29, 1985, at 75, 75 (describing clemency as a safety valve).
107 Of course it is quite proper to use the clemency power to correct certain diffi-
cult cases, since the law generally cannot be fashioned so as to cover every conceivable
situation. See S. STAFFORD, CLEMENCY: LEGAL AUTHORITY, PROCEDURE AND
STRUCTURE xvi (1977). But a continuing need for the pardoning power usually "re-
flects the need for alterations in the system preceeding it." Id. at xvi (citing NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, CORREC-
TIONS 591 (1973) (standard 16.16)).
It is interesting to note that the criminal justice system typically employs rules that
provide for the release of individuals who may well be guilty, so as to ensure the pro-
tection of the inncent-the exclusionary rule, for example. In the recantation area,
however, the emphasis seems to shift to ensuring that the guilty remain incarcerated,
even if it means that innocent persons might share their cells. This shift may be due to
a belief that unjust convictions are uncommon. See Note, Eligibility for Certificate of
Innocence under Federal Erroneous Convictions Act, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 773, 775
(1948) ("The widespread indifference to the plight of the victim of an unjust conviction
in this country is probably attributable to the notion that occurrences., of this kind are
too rare to justify public concern."). But since disclosure of errors leading to unjust
convictions often depends on the "fortuity of press notoriety," Donnelly, supra note 24,
at 22 n.7, it must be assumed that many such errors go undetected.
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cause of an unrealistically high credibility standard.
The authority to grant pardons originated in the earliest civiliza-
tions.108 It has been criticized frequently through the centuries.10 9 In
medieval England, for example, critics claimed that pardons were more
often granted for unrelated motives, such as for military necessity, than
for correcting judicial errors. 10 Use of the clemency power was further
criticized for substituting administrative discretion for judicial decision
and for making judgments uncertain rather than predictable. 1 In
modern times, the clemency power includes authority to grant a pardon
or reprieve, commute a sentence, or remiss a fine or forfeiture. 1 2 It is
justified as a means of modifying the results of inflexible rules of law
that may persist from a time laws were seen as static and inelastic and
thus not subject to social reform."'
Although the executive clemency power certainly plays an impor-
tant role in our system of justice, use of the executive power as a pan-
acea for injustices caused by applying static rules regarding recanta-
tions to motions for new trials undermines confidence in our judicial
system. There is an understandable tension among the branches of gov-
ernment regarding the proper use of the clemency power.11 4 How the
public views this tension is perhaps even* more important than such
tension itself. When a seemingly plausible recantation is rejected by a
court, the public may believe that the trial judge is keeping an innocent
person incarcerated only because the judge is reluctant to admit respon-
sibility for convicting that person. 5
Although the executive can competently entertain petitions for
clemency, the "executive's justice" may be meted out in varying de-
grees, depending upon the political climate of the times 16 or the per-
108 See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, The Historical
Background of Clemency, in CLEMENCY IN PENNSYLVANIA § 1.01-.05 (1973).
109 See id. § 1.10-.12.
110 See N. HURNARD, THE KING'S PARDON FOR HOMICIDE" BEFORE A.D. 1307,
at vii (1969).
... See id. at vii-xiv.
11 See S. STAFFORD, supra note 107, at xiii (1977).
11 See id. at xiv-xv.
114 See id. at 1.
118 See N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1985, at A26, col. 1 (stating that courts have gener-
ally resisted pleas to overturn a conviction due to recantation and recommending that
the governor of the state intervene to commute a sentence where the state courts refuse
to overturn a conviction based on perjured testimony).
"I See S. STAFFORD, supra note 107, at xv; N.Y. Times, May 20, 1985, at A12,
col. 2 (alleging that governor held clemency hearings and commuted sentence as a
means of diverting public attention from other issues); see also Donnelly, supra note
24, at 25 n.27, in which it is noted that clemency was not granted in a particular
recantation case because the governor involved had made a campaign promise not to use
the pardon power if he were elected.
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sonal beliefs of the executive with the power to grant clemency. The
crucial nature of the personal beliefs of the empowered individual is
dramatically demonstrated ly a case in which an innocent man was
convicted of murdering a man who was actually murdered by the dece-
dent's wife.117 The wife, then pregnant, had orchestrated the innocent
man's conviction through her daughter's perjured testimony because she
did not wish her unborn child to begin life in prison. After giving birth,
she vindicated the man and pleaded guilty to the crimes of murder and
perjury. The judge, exercising his statutory discretion, suspended her
sentence. The innocent man's fate was left to the governor, who de-
creed: "Somebody ought to be in the penitentiary all the time for the
murder of a sleeping man. If Judge Pegram does not believe Mrs.
Drew is guilty enough to serve her term, then the man convicted of the
murder will have to serve his term." '118
The executive clemency power, even when fully exercised, does
not always provide an adequate remedy to persons who are wrongly
convicted. Even after a full pardon, tbe wrongful conviction can be used
to discredit the innocent person as a witness, disqualify her as a judge,
or form the basis for a refusal of application for naturalization or for a
license to engage in a business or a profession. 9 Further, a pardon
may be subject to any condition that the executive chooses to impose."' 0
Clearly, innocent persons would prefer vindication through a new trial
to a grant of clemency by the executive. 21
Particularly in the recantation context, a grant of clemency by the
executive may put the judiciary in the uncomfortable position of consid-
ering a new trial motion with the realization that the defendant cannot
be reimprisoned for the same crime.122 A judicial determination of in-
nocence, however, would return certain privileges to the defendant and
vindicate her name more thoroughly than a grant of clemency. More-
over, since the grant of clemency precludes further punishment but not
retrial, the defendant has nothing to lose by seeking another trial. Fi-
nally, the possibility that duress has been used to obtain the recantation
is not lessened when executive clemency or pardon is granted instead of
a new trial. There is no logical reason for those who would coerce a
recantation in order to get a new trial to act any differently to secure a
117 See E. BORCHARD, supra note 18, at 342-44.
118 Id. at 344.
'11 See Donnelly, supra note 24, at 31-32; see generally Weihofen, supra note
105, at 179-91 (discussing conflicting views on the effects of a pardon).
120 See J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AccusED: POST-TRIAL
RIGHTS, THE PARDONING POWER § 41 (1976).
121 See Weihofen, supra note 105, at 192-93.
122 See N.Y. Tues, May 14, 1985, at B9, col 1.
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grant of clemency if they believed such a grant was within their grasp.
III. THE MINORITY APPROACH
Perhaps because of the concerns raised by an overly stringent cred-
ibility standard, some courts have taken a different approach to the
treatment of recantation testimony. The view of these courts is that a
distinction should be drawn between typical recantation cases and cases
in which the victim or sole prosecuting witness has recanted and the
remaining evidence alone is not adequate to uphold the conviction. 23
Of those states that endorse this view, Washington has taken the
boldest action. The Washington courts have squarely held that when a
defendant is convicted solely on the testimony of a witness who later
recants, it is an abuse of discretion not to grant a new trial and no
finding as to the credibility of the recantation is a prerequisite to a new
trial.12
Such a rule also seems to prevail in Pennsylvania, 25 although
there it has met with some criticism for purportedly limiting the tradi-
tional treatment of recanting co-conspirators and cofelons 26 Other
states in which courts have granted new trials where the evidence other
than that provided by the recanting witness was insufficient for convic-
tion include Arkansas127 and Michigan,'" among others.29 Pervading
123 See Bussey v. State, 69 Ark. 545, 546-47, 64 S.W. 268, 269 (1901); People v.
Smallwood, 306 Mich. 49, 51-55, 10 N.W.2d 303, 305 (1943); Commonwealth v.
Mosteller, 446 Pa. 83, 90, 284 A.2d 786, 789 (1971); State v. York, 41 Wash. App.
538, 543, 704 P.2d 1252, 1255 (1985).
114 See State v. Rolax, 84 Wash. 2d 836, 838, 529 P.2d 1078, 1079 (1974); State
v. Powell, 51 Wash. 372, 374, 98 P. 741, 742 (1909); York, 41 Wash. App. at 543, 704
P.2d at 1255. An approach demanding an automatic grant of a new trial under such
circumstances was similarly adopted in Florida but has since been abandoned. See Bor-
gess v. State, 455 So. 2d 488, 491 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (Ervin, C.J., concurring).
125 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in Commonwealth v. Mosteller:
[W]here as here the defendant's conviction is based completely on the testi-
mony of the child prosecutrix and the truth of that testimony is open to
serious question because of the testimony of a disinterested medical wit-
ness, a subsequent recantation of testimony as supported by this record
necessitates a new trial.
Mosteller, 446 Pa. at 90, 284 A.2d at 789.
128 See id. at 95, 284 A.2d at 791 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting) (accusing majority of
paying only lip service to its prior review standard while actually severely limiting
discretion of lower courts to decide whether to grant new trials based on recantations of
victims of sex crimes).
127 See Bussey v. State, 69 Ark. 545, 546-47, 64 S.W. 268, 269 (1901) (holding
that it was an error to refuse to grant a new trial where a rape conviction was based
almost exclusively on a recanting witness's testimony); see also Roath v. State, 185 Ark.
1039, 1050-51, 50 S.W.2d 985, 989 (1932) (stating that a new trial should be granted
where witness repudiates material evidence essential to the verdict); Myers v. State, 111
Ark. 399, 415, 163 S.W. 1177, 1182-83 (1914) (holding that it was reversible error to
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the opinions of the courts of these states is what seems to be an under-
lying belief that in such cases the credibility decision should be left to
the jury."'0 Some cases appear to argue that the credibility decision
should be left to the jury in all recantation cases. In Hines v. Common-
wealth,'3' for example, the court stated:
The jury found upon the original evidence that the defendant
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .But the vital
facts upon which that verdict was based were disputed, and
this new evidence, if they had heard and believed it, would
necessarily have produced a different result. We do not un-
dertake to say what weight a jury would give to the new
evidence; but it certainly ought to change the result if it is
worthy of belief, and whether it is worthy of belief is a ques-
tion which ought to be settled, not by the court, but by a
jury.
13 2
The strongest cries for leaving the credibility determination to the jury
have come from dissenting opinions. 3 One noted a "reluctance to en-
trust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge
or to a group of judges.'
'13 4
Referring the credibility inquiry to a new jury in cases in which
the victim or sole prosecuting witness has recanted and the remaining
evidence alone cannot be considered adequate to uphold the conviction
eases at least two concerns raised by traditional treatment of recanta-
tions. It eases due process concerns because it ensures that in such cases
one can effectively challenge a conviction based upon perjury,3 5 and it
ensures adequate review on appeal."3 6 The latter is especially true be-
refuse to grant a new trial where, apart from the recanted testimony, the remaining
evidence would have been insufficient to convict).
128 See People v. Smallwood, 306 Mich. 49, 54-55, 10 N.W.2d. 303, 305 (1943)
(holding that it was an error not to grant a new trial where there was a showing of
hostile motive on the part of a recanting witness).
129 See cases collected in Annotation, supra note 6, at 907, 918-23.
130 See, e.g., Bussey, 69 Ark. at 547, 64 S.W. at 269 (stating that "whatever the
truth may be, whether the defendant be guilty or innocent, it can be established by
another trial"); State v. York, 41 Wash. App. 538, 544-45, 704 P.2d 1252, 1255-56
(1985) (arguing that credibility determination should be made by jury),
231 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843 (1923).
132 Id. at 750-51, 117 S.E. at 849-50.
's3 See, e.g., Smith v. State, 141 Conn. 202, 215, 104 A.2d 761, 766 (1954)
(O'Sullivan, J., dissenting); People v. Shilitano, 218 N.Y. 161, 195, 112 N.E. 733, 744
(1916) (Hogan, J., dissenting).
131 Commonwealth v. Coleman, 438 Pa. 373, 379-80, 264 A.2d 649, 652 (1970)
(Roberts, J., dissenting) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).
'35 See supra notes 89-104 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
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cause referring the credibility inquiry to a new jury alleviates the con-
cern that the trial judge considering the recantation motion will be hesi-
tant to reverse the factual findings on which she had passed judgment.
Referring the credibility inquiry to the jury only in cases devoid of sup-
porting evidence would do little, however, to abate the aforementioned
concerns in cases where there is other circumstantial evidence present,
whether by sheer happenstance.3 or through human manufacture.138
Thus, the development of a standard that could take into account all
recantation cases is more desirable than the minority approach.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS
A. The Reasonable Possibility Approach
The credibility standard used to judge a recantation asserted as a
ground for a new trial should be relaxed in order to make new trials
easier to obtain in cases where suspicion and distrust are less war-
ranted. This relaxation could be achieved through use of the standard
proposed below while still ensuring that new trials are not available to
manipulative defendants seeking to perpetrate fraud upon the courts.
The Reasonable Possibility Approach would provide as follows:
Where the recanting occurred under specific circumstances
reasonably free from suspicion of duress or improper motive,
and, upon a new trial the original trial testimony reasonably
could be found false, a new trial will be granted-provided,
however, that the other applicable requirements for a new
trial are met.1 39
The remainder of this Comment will discuss this proposed standard. 4°
137 See generally S. PHILLIPS, FAMOUS CASES OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
(1979) (discussing the theory of presumptive proof and providing 32 cases in which
circumstantial evidence pointed to the wrong person).
... While at first blush evidence created by human contrivance may seem a far-
fetched notion, it should be noted that even in the recantation case used as the anecdotal
introduction for this Comment, the recanting witness claimed to have created the evi-
dence to support her story. See supra note 1.
"39 It is not the purpose of this Comment to propose significant changes in the
requirements for a new trial other than the basic credibility inquiry. The proposed
standard is intended to enable a court to make a preliminary credibility determination
so that it could then apply new trial motion criteria in accordance with Larrison v.
United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928), and Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511 (1851). For
example, once the two-pronged credibility inquiry proposed above is favorably com-
pleted, a court may grant a new trial if: (a) a different result might be reached if the
recantation is credited, (b) the evidence has been discovered since the trial, and (c) the
evidence could not have been discovered before trial by the exercise of due diligence.
140 This is an appropriate place to note that this Comment does not seek to ad-
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The elements involved will be explored in more detail and considera-
tions in implementing the standard will be discussed.
1. The "Reasonably Free from Suspicion of Duress or Improper
Motive" Element
The first element of the proposed standard contains two distinct,
though interrelated, requirements. First, the phrase "under specific cir-
cumstances" affirmatively requires an analysis of the specific factual
situation in each case and expressly rejects any presumption regarding
untrustworthiness as a general matter. The entire first requirement is
intended to be a replacement for the presumption of untrustworthiness.
Secondly, the phrase "reasonably free" is employed in order to
make clear that mere speculation as to duress or improper motive is not
sufficient. For example, a judge could not rely solely on there being
"something suspicious" about a witness's recanting because such reli-
ance would in effect amount to indulgence in a presumption of untrust-
worthiness. On the other hand, a judge could find that the recantation
of a codefendant who had been subjected to pressure from fellow in-
mates was not, under those specific circumstances, reasonably free from
suspicion of duress or improper motive. 41 If a judge's finding on the
"reasonably free" requirement is adverse to the applicant, the judge
would retain discretion to deny the new trial motion. While this aspect
of the proposed standard may seem somewhat lacking in precedential
support, some courts have employed similarly phrased language in re-
cantation cases.
142
2. The "Reasonably Could Be Found False" Element
The major difference between the proposed standard and current
standards is that this element shifts the credibility focus from the judge
ruling on the new trial motion to the factfinder at the new trial. Such a
focus is not a novel one, as it has been advocated by a number of courts
for some time. 14s In those cases in which the recantation is so incredible
dress the issue of whether the time limit for filing a motion for new trial based upon
newly discovered evidence, which is two years in the federal courts, is fair or should be
abandoned. See generally 3 C. WRIGHT, supra note 14, § 558, at 361-63 (explaining
the time limit and briefly noting the argument against imposing any time limit at all on
such motions).
141 See, e.g., State v. Carter, 66 N.C. App. 21, 31-32, 311 S.E.2d 5, 11 (1984).
142 See, e.g., State v. Mooney, 670 S.W.2d 510, 516 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v.
Fuentes, 66 N.M. 52, 60-61, 342 P.2d 1080, 1085 (1959) .
14 See e.g., Lombardo v. State, 172 Conn. 385, 393, 374 A.2d 1065, 1069 (1977)
(Bogdanski, J., dissenting) (arguing that a new trial motion should not be denied just
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that the original trial testimony could not reasonably be found false, the
judge would retain discretion to deny the new trial motion. In those
cases, however, in which it appears that in a new trial the original trial
testimony reasonably could be found false, it would be error not to
grant a new trial.
Thus, the proposed standard falls between two extreme ap-
proaches, one advocating that credibility be left entirely to the jury,""'
and the other, that credibility be left entirely to the judge,14 in order to
achieve a test that is both workable and equitable. If adopted, the pro-
posed standard would effectively reduce the defendant's burden of proof
on the issue of credibility. It would also help to dispel the fear that the
judge hearing the recantation evidence, typically the same judge who
presided at the trial, may be overly reluctant to reverse.-46 Finally, the
proposed standard would provide for greater reviewability on appeal
because it would require that specific factual findings be made. 4
B. Considerations in Implementing the New Standard
While it is impossible to enumerate all the considerations involved
iri making a decision on a motion for a new trial based upon recanta-
tion evidence, some are particularly worth noting. First, in determining
whether the recantation occurred under specific circumstances reasona-
bly free from suspicion of duress or improper motive, the personal rela-
tionship between the recanting witness and the defendant might be con-
sidered because of its strong probative value on the issue of
motivation.148 A judge might thus justifiably consider the credibility
standard to be met by the defendant to be somewhat higher in cases of
incest149 or in codefendant cases where the recantor and petitioner are
because the trial judge refuses to believe the evidence and that the test should be
whether the jury could reasonably extend credibility to it); Smith v. State, 141 Conn.
202, 214-18, 104 A.2d 761, 766-68 (1954) (O'Sullivan, J., dissenting) (advocating the
granting of a new trial motion if there is a "reasonable probability" that jury will
believe the new evidence); see also supra note 131.
144 See People v. Shilitano, 218 NY. 161, 195-99, 112 N.E. 733, 744-46 (1916)
(Hogan, J., dissenting).
145 See id. at 180, 112 N.E. at 739 (Cardozo, J., concurring); 3 C. WRIGHT,
supra note 14, § 557, at 336-37.
146 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
147 See generally supra notes 87-88 (explaining that under present law judges
rarely state the factual basis for their determinations).
148 See, e.g., State v. Salinas, 129 Ariz. 364, 631 P.2d 519 (1981) (noting that
because the recanting witnesses were a friend and a relative of the defendant's, their
credibility was affected).
149 False recantations by sexually abused children are not uncommon. The im-
proper motives that induce such recantations include guilt and pressure from family
members. See N.Y. Times, May 9, 1985, at A25, col. 1.
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cellmates. 50 This is not to say that there should be a presumption that
the recantation is generally more suspect in such situations, but rather
that the lack of an arm's length relationship should be considered in
determining whether the recantation is reasonably free from suspicion
of duress or improper motive. When inquiring into motivation, a court
may properly limit its consideration to whether there is any evidence of
a stronger motivation to make a false recantation than to give false trial
testimony.
Second, in determining whether in a new trial the original trial
testimony reasonably could be found false, an important consideration
is whether the recanting witness's testimony places the occurrence of
the crime itself in dispute15 ' or leaves the verdict stripped of evidence
sufficient to sustain it.'52 Numerous other factors may need to be con-
sidered, depending on the facts of each case. Those factors normally
considered by judges in evaluating credibility, such as the witness's de-
meanor, would also remain relevant.
53
How these considerations could be employed in implementing the
proposed standard can best be illustrated through the use of two hy-
potheticals. Suppose that D1 has been tried and convicted of sexually
molesting V1, his minor daughter. At the trial, the medical evidence
was consistent with a finding of a continuing incestuous relationship
and the girl's elementary school teacher testified that VI gave detailed
accounts of the assaults. Since the conviction, the girl has been living
with an elderly aunt. After returning from a visit to see her father at
prison, the girl becomes despondent, She asks when her father can
come home and is told it will be ten years. V1 then recants. Under the
proposed standard the burden of proving the veracity of the recantation
rests with D1, but he will not be burdened by a presumption of un-
trustworthiness. Due to the lack of an arm's length relationship, how-
ever, and because the recantation came shortly after the girl became
distraught over her father's imprisonment, a judge might well conclude
1I See State v. Sims, 99 Ariz. 302, 310, 409 P.2d 17, 22 (1965) (noting that a
prisoner serving a life sentence has little to lose by assisting another defendant to avoid
punishment).
1I See generally N.Y. Times, May 9, 1985, at A25, col. I (Norval Morris, a
professor of law and criminology at the University of Chicago, expresses the view that
the usual restrictive rules on recantations should not apply when the "victim" later
claims the crime never occurred.).
15 See 3 C. WRIGHT, supra note 14, § 557, at 323-24 n.21; supra notes 123-38
and accompanying text.
I"5 See, e.g., State v. Carter, 69 N.J. 420, 427-28, 354 A.2d 627, 631-32 (1976)
("Manner of expression, sincerity, candor and straightforwardness are just some of the
intangibles available to the trial judge in evaluating the credibility of recantation
testimony.").
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that the recantation had not occurred under specific circumstances rea-
sonably free from suspicion of duress or improper motive.
Now suppose that D2 has been tried and convicted of car theft. At
trial, the evidence showed that D2 was in possession of V2's car and
V2 testified to seeing D2 remove it from V2's driveway. V2 was in the
habit of leaving the keys in the glove compartment. D2 claimed to have
met V2 a few days earlier at a party where V2 had given D2 permis-
sion to use the car. One year after D2's conviction, V2 recants, admit-
ting to perjury and that D2 had permission to borrow the car.
In this case, there are no specific circumstances indicating duress
or improper motive. The parties have an arm's length relationship and
there is no evidence of a stronger motivation to give a false recantation
than to give false trial testimony. Therefore, this recantation would
likely satisfy the "reasonably free from duress" test. The recantation
would next be analyzed under the "reasonably could be found false"
test. In this second hypothetical, the recantation leaves the verdict
stripped of evidence sufficient to sustain it and even places the occur-
rence of the crime in dispute. Taking into account the witness's de-
meanor and other factors, the factfinder at a new trial could reasonably
find that the trial testimony had been false and that the recantation is
true. Thus, a new trial would be granted.
These examples indicate that the proposed standard would con-
tinue to limit the granting of new trials. The proposed standard may
seem somewhat lax if literally applied and may even cause some to
express anew old fears concerning the indiscriminate granting of new
trial motions. 1"5 But it should not be forgotten that such criticism
proved empty when aimed at the Larrison standard.
1 55
The proposed standard seeks to reject the unjustifiably strict and
static recantation rules that currently blanket the country. Regardless of
what else might be said regarding the treatment of recantations, one
thing cannot be denied: "The worst consequence of granting the [new
trial] motion is that the state will have the expense of another
trial. . . . [T~he worst consequence of denying the motion is that the
defendants remain convicted of a crime which they might not have com-
mitted.""56 As one judge concluded, "'But I think justice is more im-
'4 But see People v. Shilitano, 218 N.Y. 161, 195, 112 N.E. 733, 744-46 (1916)
(Hogan, J., dissenting) (stating that the risk of convicting an innocent person is a
greater evil than the danger of establishing a precedent that would enable former wit-
nesses to trifle with the administration of justice by permitting them to confess to per-
jury and enable one convicted of a crime to secure a new trial).
1'5 See 3 C. WRIGHT, supra note 14, § 557.1, at 346-47; Note, supra note 15, at
180-81.
"' State v. Keely, 101 Idaho 711, 712 n.4, 620 P.2d 284, 285 n.4 (1980).
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portant than expense.' "157
CONCLUSION
Our courts need to rethink carefully the current treatment of re-
cantations, especially in those cases in which a victim or sole prosecut-
ing witness recants apparently without threat, bribe, or other improper
influence. The courts must structure the credibility inquiry in recanta-
tion cases to provide a realistic judicial solution for instances in which
an arguably innocent person has been incarcerated for a crime which
may not have even occurred. 158 Until judicial provision is made for
such instances, denials of motions for new trials in these "unusual"
cases will continue to arouse public outcry and erode confidence in our
judicial system.
159
157 Id. at 712, 620 P.2d at 285 (citing the unpublished opinion of the trial judge).
"I While the judiciary is the most likely organ to reform the treatment of recanta-
tions, state legislatures could also accomplish reforms.
"I It should be noted, however, that the public outcry over the Webb-Dotson
controversy, see supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text, might well have resulted even
under the standard proposed herein, because that outcry erupted following denial, not
of a new trial motion but apparently of a motion to vacate. See Black, Why Judge
Samuels Sent Gary Dotson Back to Prison, 71 A.B.A. J. 45, 45 (1985). Under the
analysis suggested in the proposed standard, it seems clear that Dotson should have
been entitled to a new trial. Judge Samuels, however, should not be criticized for his
decision: "[T]he learned and upright judge who tried this case followed the almost
unbroken current of authority." Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 750, 116 S.E.
843, 849 (1923).
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